V alid disorders are subject to the disease of inflation. Any solid, established diagnosis that is popular and appealing risks overuse and becomes overloaded with excess features. Such is the fate of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Once a well-defined, well-characterized condition, it has currently expanded from the consequences of terrifying battles to the outcome of purported abuse in childhood. The alleged abuse is sometimes "recovered" and ranges from forgotten forbidden touching to the most serious and harmful invasion of the bodies and minds of children. It is time to call a halt to the unscientific expansion of PTSD. It harms patients to give them the wrong diagnosis with the wrong assumptions.
Modern descriptions of PTSD date from the time of the Russo-Japanese War (1904) (1905) , in which early versions of high-explosive shells were used. These differed from cannonballs and other projectiles in that blasts occurred on impact, producing additional damage to bodies and structures and scattering shrapnel. Contemporary reports recognized a condition amounting to a traumatic war neurosis, marked by confusional states, brief excitement and irritability, fearfulness, and emotional instability. The typical and enduring pattern was further identified in France following explosions of the naval ships Iéna and Liberté in Toulon dockyard in 1907 and 1911. After eliminating cases in which organic factors might have been relevant, Hésnard 1 recorded posttraumatic psychological responses including an initial state of semisomnambulism, automatic mental activity, absorption in some trivial occupation (for example, saving some garment), a strange lucidity or increased clarity, a feeling of exaltation, and a period of anterograde amnesia. The dockyard rescuers also showed symptoms of disturbance for several weeks, including recapitulation of the scene, terrifying dreams, diffuse anxiety, fatigue, and various minor phobias. This knowledge of emotional change after explosions, quickly abstracted in English, became part of the contemporary climate of ideas. 1, 2 In the First World War, soldiers who became panic-stricken and ran away, or who were too fearful to go into battle, were liable to be executed; more than 300 men in the British forces were shot for cowardice. Thus to complain of anxiety was unacceptable, although, as the war progressed, it was recognized that soldiers who had fought most bravely might "lose their nerve" after increased exposure to risk-even those decorated for exceptional gallantry might break down with anxiety. Many individuals who were not overtly wounded by explosive blasts but were nearby when they occurred developed paralysis, difficulty with limbs, or other symptoms, which came to be recognized as hysteria.
The idea that symptoms were produced by the blast of high explosives caused the condition to be labelled shell shock. The term was applied to individuals who developed symptoms such as paralysis, amnesias, deafness, and visual difficulties. These symptoms, grafted onto the basic anxiety response, served a social and cultural purpose, enabling the individual to retreat from battle with dignity and-for a short while-sympathy. Soon the numbers of individuals given the diagnosis grew too large to be accommodated by armies that needed to keep their soldiers fighting. Diagnoses changed. After shell shock, the ultimate pattern of chronic anxiety related to particular events was recognized fairly well as combat neurosis and then, later, as posttraumatic stress disorder. 2 Through the rest of the First World War and during the Second World War, a stunned, semiautomatic victim with a pattern of characteristic anxiety symptoms relating to the event was treated with some degree of insight and support, and the pattern was recognized under various terms such as combat neurosis. Later, the same notion-rediscovered in Vietnam-was captured in both DSM-IV and ICD-10 descriptions.
Not all individuals who experience stress or trauma, whether in battle or in civilian life, and who develop symptoms, necessarily show the typical anxiety pattern. Some become depressed. Others resort to alcohol or inappropriate drug use or show a preexisting personality disorder or typical hysterical symptoms. It is a mistake to link all these responses under the heading of PTSD; however, in practice, dissociation is now proffered as a major factor in PTSD. Blurring the outline The Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, Vol 52, No 8, August 2007 W of the original diagnosis, some have suggested that borderline personality disorder be reconceptualized into PTSD-of course, changing the criteria of the latter. Thus the proposed category of complex PTSD 3 is expanded into 2 types of complex PTSD, disorganized and organized, 4 and the attempt is made, without too much evidence, to link both with PTSD and a childhood history of deprivation or abuse.
A little indulgence in extra diagnoses of PTSD, rather than simply recognizing episodic anxiety or the exacerbation of chronic anxiety in anxious individuals, would neither acquire major epidemiologic importance nor lead to an unreasonable variation in medical practice. The problem is that the excessive diagnosis of PTSD is linked to the alleged phenomena of "dissociation." On the basis of this linkage, attempts are made to relate supposed or actual ill-treatment in childhood to the classic pattern of PTSD that emerges from acute exposure to danger. These attempts extend to including in PTSD phenomena such as forgotten misfortunes recalled, loss of contact with reality, fugues and amnesias, and even multiple personality disorder or its current disguise, dissociative identity disorder.
Verifying Harm
An attractive diagnosis to cover symptoms that might not otherwise be respectable will be adopted more often than is appropriate. Frueh et al 5 described a series of 100 consecutive US veterans in a PTSD clinic reporting Vietnam combat experience; of these, 93% had documentation of war zone service. They divided their subjects into 3 groups, namely, those with objective evidence of combat experience, those whose combat experience was unclear, and those for whom there was no evidence of combat. The investigators compared members of the groups on several variables, including the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-II scales, the Beck Depression Inventory, the Mississippi Combat PTSD Scale (a self-report measure), and the Clinician Administered PTSD Scale (CAPS). A significant difference was found in the CAPS, with higher scores in the Vietnam "unclear combat" group. Wessely, 6 discussing recent British military experience, including the Gulf War, concludes that there has been "a widening of the boundaries of psychiatric injury." In its initial formulation, PTSD could be diagnosed only after a genuine threat to life and limb; then, it could be offered as a diagnosis for people who felt they were in peril, even if they were not. Finally, PTSD may be attributed to any adverse experience, even normal experiences in childhood.
Strikingly, it turns out that the symptoms of PTSD occur frequently after nontraumatic events. Mol et al 7 reviewed data from a general adult population to determine whether life events, such as divorce or unemployment, would generate as many symptoms of posttraumatic stress as would standard traumatic events, such as accidents or abuse. They identified an initial sample of nearly 3000 adults representative of the family practice population in The Netherlands, of whom one-half returned questionnaires concerning the symptoms of PTSD as well as actual traumatic experiences. There are always problems with retrospective survey data, but it is worth noting that, in this survey of events, the PTSD scores were higher after life events than after traumatic events. This does not mean that the syndrome of PTSD does not exist but, rather, that it is easy to confuse it with anxiety and related symptoms arising commonly for nontraumatic reasons.
Fashions come and go in diagnosis as in therapy. The fashion for PTSD has come, may decline, and may return again. Currently, the attempt to link PTSD with dissociation, as well as with claims of childhood abuse that are often hard to verify, needs to be recognized and, once recognized, should be rejected.
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